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Abstract. The convolutional neural network is the crucial tool for the recent success
of deep learning based methods on various computer vision tasks like classification,
segmentation, and detection. Convolutional neural networks achieved state-of-the-art
performance in these tasks and every day pushing the limit of computer vision and AI.
However,  adversarial  attack  on  computer  vision  systems  is  threatening  their
application  in  the  real  life  and  in  safety-critical  applications.  Necessarily, Finding
adversarial examples are important to detect susceptible models to attack and take
safeguard measures to overcome the adversarial attacks. In this regard, MCS 2018
Adversarial Attacks on Black Box Face Recognition challenge aims to facilitate the
research  of  finding  new  adversarial  attack  techniques  and  their  effectiveness  in
generating  adversarial  examples.  In  this  challenge,  the  attack’s nature  is  targeted-
attack on the black-box neural network where we have no knowledge about black-
block’s inner structure.  The attacker must  modify a set  of  five images of a single
person so that the neural network miss-classify them as target image which is a set of
five images of another person. In this competition, we applied Momentum Diverse
Input  Iterative  Fast  Gradient  Sign Method (M-DI2-FGSM) to make an adversarial
attack on black-box face recognition system. We tested our method on MCS 2018
Adversarial Attacks on Black Box Face Recognition challenge and found competitive
result. Our solution got validation score 1.404 which better than baseline score 1.407
and stood 14 place among 132 teams in the leader-board. Further improvement can be
achieved by finding improved feature extraction from source image, carefully chosen
hyper-parameters,  finding  improved  substitute  model  of  the  black-box  and  better
optimization method. The Code is available for download  in the following  github
link: https://github.com/miltonbd/mcs_2018_adversarial_attack
 1  Introduction
After  the  last  AI  winter,  since  2012  deep  learning  based  neural  networks  are  state-of-the-art
technology  for  computer  vision  and  achieved  an  unprecedented  result  on  various  vision  tasks,
including image classification [1,7-9], object detection [10-13] and semantic segmentation [14-16].
However, due CNN's internal structure and way of work, they are can be compromised by adversarial
images with small modifications which is impossible to differentiate by the human eye. Deep neural
networks (DNNs) can be compromised by their inability to tackle adversarial examples [4, 5], which
carefully devised by adding small, human-imperceptible noises to legitimate examples as mentioned in
figure 1. This attack is successful in both scenario of targeted and non-targeted attack. In targeted
where the final in-accurate output set by the attacker and in no-targeted attack where the model’s
output  can  be  any  of  the  inaccurate  predictions.  Arguably, the  time  has  come  to  take  safeguard
measures  and  incorporate  built-in  defenses  against  adversarial  attack  in  the  real-world  machine
learning system like the autonomous vehicle, drone vision, face recognition etc. systems.
 
Fig 1. Adversarial example of the panda with added perturbation.
Images   generated   by   adversarial   attack   can   be   employed   to   a   different   domain   like   image
segmentation[24]   and   in   reinforcement   learning[25].   Several   studies   focus   on   understanding   the
insufficiency of current training algorithms [6,25,26,32] against adversarial examples. Many important
methods [3,5,20,26,27,31] have been developed recently  to find adversarial  examples.  Adversarial
examples can be a severe security threat to practical computer vision applications. In particular, an
adversarial  example[4]   that  was designed  to be miss­classified by a  model  A  is  often also miss­
classified by a model B. This adversarial example’s transferability property means that it is possible to
generate adversarial examples and perform a miss­classification attack on a machine learning system
without access to the underlying model.  Such attacks can be done in the real world [29,30]. Data
augmentation  [7­9]  has  been proved to be a  viable  solution to  prevent  networks  from overfitting
during the training process. Clearly, a series of transformation like resizing, cropping and rotating, are
applied to the images to enhance the training set, make robust model and thus prevent adversarial
examples  based  attack.  As  a   result,   the   trained  networks  will  be   robust  unknown  input  and  will
generalize  well.  Also,   image  augmentation[20,31]   can  defend  against   adversarial   examples  under
certain   situations,  which  proves   that   adversarial   examples   cannot  generalize  well   under  different
transformations. To this extent, we explored the Diverse Input Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method
(DI­2­FGSM)   based attack on MCS 2018 Adversarial Attacks on Black Box Face Recognition to
improve   the   transferability   of   adversarial   examples.  At   each   iteration,  we   diverse   the   inputs   by
applying augmentation using imgaug[2] library. This way the model has always some modified source
image which reduces overfitting. This method performed better than the baseline method.
 2   Background And Related work
In this section, we will review the background information and related works about the adversarial
attack. The main goal of the adversarial attack is to fabricate new image by adding carefully controlled
noise to the original image in such a way that the changes are almost undetectable to the human eye.
Fig 2. Black-box and its substitute model.
In the white box attack, the intruder has access to the model parameters and in the black box attack the
intruder has no access to the model  parameters.  Thus,  for the black box attack,  a mechanism,  to
replicate the black box network’s internal functionality is needed. The black box and substitute model
relation is shown in figure 2. The goal of non-targeted attacks is to compel the model to miss-classify
the adversarial image and in the targeted attack, the goal is to miss-classify the source image into a
fixed wrong class. Most prominent attacks are gradient-based attacks where the attacker modifies the
source image by observing the flow of gradient and other techniques. In this way, the attackers modify
the image in the direction of the gradient of the loss function with respect to the input image. One-shot
attacks  and  iterative  attacks  are  popular  in  gradient-based  attacks.  In  one-shot  attack,  where  the
attacker takes a single step in the direction of the gradient, and in the iterative attack where instead of a
single  step,  several  steps  are  used  to  adversarial  exmaples.  Several  methods[22,33]  have  been
developed to tackle the adversarial attacks. Both the adversarial attack and defense are being improved
by ongoing research.
 3   Attack Methods
In the recent years, extensive research brought about a variety of gradient based adversarial attack 
methods. The evolution of gradient-based attack are in following sections.
 3.1  Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
FGSM[5] is the first member in this attack family, which finds the adversarial perturbations in the
direction of the loss gradient and the adversarial example image generation equation can be expressed
as:
 ………………..(1) 
 3.2   Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM)
Kurakin et al. [27] extended FGSM to an iterative version, which can be expressed as:
………………..(2) 
the original image X, n is the iteration number and α is the step size.
 3.3  Momentum Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (MI-FGSM)
MI-FGSM was proposed to integrate the momentum term into the attack process to stabilize update
directions and escape from poor local maxima. The updating procedure is similar to I-FGSM,
………………..(3)
Where μ is the decay factor of the momentum term and gn is the accumulated gradient at iteration n.
 3.4  Diverse Input Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (DI2-FGSM)
In diverse input, various changes are applied to source image like random crop, gaussian blur with 
Sigma 0.5, contrast normalization, affine transformation with scaling, transformation, rotate and shear.
………………..(4)
………………..(5)
Momentum and diverse inputs work differently to prevent overfitting phenomenon. Combination both
known as Momentum Diverse Inputs Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (M-DI2-FGSM) has good
potential as a good adversarial attack method. The overall updating procedure of M-DI2 -FGSM is
similar to MI-FGSM :
………………..(6)
Fig 3. The relationship among fast gradient step method.
Figure 3 shows the relationship among gradient step methods. If the transformation[36] probability is
p = 0, M-DI 2 -FGSM degrades to MI-FGSM, and DI-2 -FGSM degrades to I-FGSM; If the decay
factor μ = 0, M-DI 2 -FGSM degrades to DI 2 -FGSM, and MI-FGSM degrades to I-FGSM, If the
total iteration number N = 1, I-FGSM degrades to FGSM. In all above equations positive sign before
the α indicates that the attack is non-targeted and for the targeted attacks the α sign will be negative.
 4  Challenge Details
Faces are an important natural way to recognize people. It is the extension of general face detection to
provide recognition of an individual. Recent deep learning and computer vision technology enables to
scale  up  face  recognition  to  correctly  recognize  millions  of  identity.  Modern  methods  of  face
recognition easily surpass human performance while relying on machine learning and neural networks
based techniques.  This type of face recognition system will  enable modern bio-metric system and
other real-world applications. However, such face recognition system can be vulnerable to attacks
aiming to fabricate the network’s final output. Seemingly, arbitrary changes to the network output can
be  produced  by  small  and  well-designed  modifications  of  the  network  input,  as  known  under
adversarial examples.
                    
                 Fig 4.  MCS 2018 Adversarial Attacks on Black Box Face Recognition.
The strategy for adversarial attack on face recognition system is given in figure 4. Here, Im1 is the
original source image. G(Im1) is the adversarial image with perturbation crafted by attacker which
will be miss-classified by face recognition system as Im2.
 5  Proposed Methodology
 5.1  Make Substitute Model
In order to guess the internal parameters and simulate the attack, we need a substitute model[28] black
box. We used densenet based methods to make a substitute classification model by feeding the output
of the model to our system as input and using our known labels of those inputs. We used 1M face
recognition data provided by the organizer to train the classifier. MEAN = [0.485, 0.456, 0.406] STD
= [0.229, 0.224, 0.225] used for normalizing the input data.
 5.2  Fine Tuning
As the amounts of training examples is insufficient for training a deep convolutional network from
scratch, so we used the imagenet pre-trained DenseNet model to initialize the network parameters,
freeze the initial layers and fine-tuned the last several layers. We kept the weight of all layers except
FC and output layer was frozen in first few iterations of training due to high unstable gradient flow.
After  few  iterations  of  training,  we  unfreeze  the  last  few  layers  and  adjust  their  weight  by
backpropagation. Fine-tuning helps to train easily and prevents it from overfitting. Obviously, the fine-
tuned network can lead to a better convergence.
 5.3  Pre­Processing
First  the  images  is  center  cropped  from 224  to  112.  Transforms.  The  source  image   pixels  are
normalized using MEAN [0.485, 0.456, 0.406] and STD = [0.229, 0.224, 0.225].
 5.4  Diverse Input
we are given with 5 source images and 5 target images. We keep the target images same without
augmentation and to satisfy the diverse input feature of the algorithm we augmented the 5 source face
images to 20. Some augmented images are mentioned in figure 5.
   
 
Fig 5. Augmented images as diverse input.
Data   augmentation  methods   used  were     random   crop,   Gaussian   blur   with   Sigma   0.5,   contrast
normalization, affine transformation with scaling, transformation, rotate and shear. We also applied
grayscale  conversion  for  some  images.  All  augmentations  were  done using   imgaug[1].  The   input
images with probability p went through the diverse input transformation and 1­p were fed to the model
as usual.
 5.5  Attack Details
We run the attack for maximum 60 epochs. For some images, we were having too much or too little
gradient propagation and sometime it was found that after all iteration the SSIM is still 1 and another
time after 1 iteration, it went below 0.95. In both cases, we adjusted the epsilon with either multiplying
or dividing the initial eps with factor 2.
 6  Evaluation
To evaluate the model performance, we fed the 1000 images to substitute model and generate the
adversarial example. We also extracted a 1000*512 descriptor to be uploaded to the evaluation server
as per directed by the organizer. For the evaluation of the result, we have to upload the generated
adversarial images and 1000*512 face descriptor in a single zip file. The Structural Similarity Index
(SSIM) was used for measuring original and generated image difference and that must be below above
.95 threshold.
 7  Implementation Details
For implementation and simulate the adversarial attack, PyTorch[23] deep learning framework was
chosen. We used 2 1080TI GPU based pc with CUDA 9 and Ubuntu 16.04 OS. This computing power
was not enough to get the result quickly, hence lowered the chance to ace the competition leaderboard.
 8  Results and Discussion
Our Momentum Diverse Input Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (M-DI2-FGSM) achieved 1.404 in
the final leaderboard which is better than baseline value of 1.407. We secured 14 th position in the final
leaderboard. Due to the late participation and the limited deadline, we did not get to the very top in the
competition leaderboard and we believe there is ample opportunity to extend the attack method with
more improved feature extraction from source image, carefully chosen hyper-parameters, and finding
improved substitute model of the black-box. In addition to that, a bigger dataset with improved image
augmentation reduces the risk of overfitting on the black-box model and thus, substitute model mimics
the black-box network well. Moreover, performing additional regularization tweaks and fine-tuning of
hyper-parameters may improve model’s robustness. Along with densenet to make substitute model of
black-box, other network models like SENet[17], NASNet[18], PNASNet[19] might be explored.
 9  Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated that Momentum Diverse Input Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (M-
DI2-FGSM) can be effectively applied to adversarial attack on the face recognition system. This could
elicit a great opportunity to test the face recognition system against this robust adversarial attack and
pave  the  way  to  take  measures  against  adversarial  attack.  Moreover,  Adversarial  training,  input
sanitization are the important measures to make sure that the face recognition system has already taken
care of the adversarial example of input images.
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